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You Can't Have Your Trust and
Defeat It Too: Why Mandatory
Arbitration Provisions in Trusts Are
Enforceable, and Why State Courts
Are Getting It Wrong
Rachal v. Reitz'
I. INTRODUCTION
This note addresses a recent decision by the Texas State Court of Appeals
concerning the enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions found in testa-
mentary instruments, and specifically, inter vivos trusts.2 After analyzing the legal
background of arbitration, the use of contract principles to analyze both arbitration
and trust agreements, and statutory enactments making trust arbitration provisions
enforceable, this note will discuss the nuanced relationship between contract prin-
ciples of construction, arbitration agreements, and trust instruments, and specifi-
cally the relationship between trust agreements and contracts. In analyzing these
relationships, this note will also address the differences between the statute at
issue in Rachal v. Reitz and the Arizona arbitration statute at issue in Schone-
berger v. Delze,3 the landmark case addressing the enforceability of trust arbitra-
tion provisions. Additionally, the relationship between contract law, trust instru-
ments, and the role of settlors' intent will be briefly discussed. Finally, this note
will argue that mandatory arbitration provisions found in valid trust instruments
should be enforced when they would effectuate the settlor's unambiguous intent.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
John W. Reitz was the beneficiary of the A.F. Reitz Trust, an inter vivos trust
established by his father, A.F. Reitz.4 At the time that A.F. Reitz established the
trust, he made himself the sole initial trustee and appointed his attorney, Hal Ra-
chal, as the successor trustee.5 After A.F. Reitz's death, Hal Rachal became the
trustee, pursuant to the terms of the Trust.6 John Reitz brought an action against
Mr. Rachal, both individually and as successor trustee, in Texas Probate Court.7 In
1. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App. 2011).
2. Id. at 307.
3. Schoneberger v. Oclze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082 (2004), superseded by statute, 2008 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 247, § 16 (2d Reg. Sess.) (current version at ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (West,
Westlaw through 2d Reg. Sess. 2012).
4. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 307.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.; In re the A.F. Reitz Trust, Cause No. PRO9-03183-P2 (Tex. Prob. Ct. No. 2 2009).
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his complaint, Reitz alleged that Rachal had failed to satisfy Texas statutory ac-
counting requirements, constituting a breach of Mr. Rachal's fiduciary duty." Ad-
ditionally, the fiduciary duty claim accused Rachal of concealing his routine use
of trust funds for his personal gain and requested that Rachal be removed as trus-
tee.9
Rachal filed a motion to compel arbitration and to stay litigation of the matter
in Texas District Court,i0 pursuant to the Texas General Arbitration Act (TAA).1
Rachal's motion to compel arbitration cited a provision in the Trust evidencing the
settlor's intent that disputes involving the trust be resolved by arbitration.12 The
trial court summarily denied Rachal's motions.' 3 Rachal filed an interlocutory
appeal with the Court of Appeals of Texas seeking a reversal of the trial court's
order. 14 On appeal to the court of appeals, Rachal argued that he had successfully
established the existence of a valid arbitration agreement, that Mr. Reitz's claims
fell within the purview of this agreement, and therefore, that the trial court denied
his motion in error.'5 The court of appeals heard Rachal's interlocutory appeal,
and finding the arbitration provision of the trust was not a binding arbitration
agreement, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of Rachal's motions.16
Holding that a mandatory arbitration provision in a trust instrument 7 is not
enforceable, the court emphasized the "foundational principle" that parties may
not be compelled to arbitrate a dispute without having expressly agreed to do so.' 8
The court explained that under the TAA, parties must enter into a "specific, mutu-
al agreement to arbitrate before a court will force a party to relinquish its judicial
rights and remedies."' 9 The court cited arbitration's foundation in contract law,20
explaining that the validity of an arbitration agreement is therefore measured by
its validity under traditional contract law.21 Validity under contract law, the court
explained, requires than an arbitration agreement itself satisfy the requirements of
a contract, or exist in a valid contract. 22
8. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 307.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001, 171.098 (West 2005).
12. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 307. The trust document contained the following provision:
Arbitration. Despite anything herein to the contrary, I indent that as to any dispute of any kind involv-
ing this Trust or any of the parties or persons concerned herewith (e.g. beneficiaries, Trustees), arbitra-
tion as provided herein shall be the sole and exclusive remedy ...
Id. at 308.
13. Id. at 307.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id at 311-12.
17. Hereinafter referred to as a "trust arbitration provisions," unless otherwise noted.
18. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 308 (citing Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex. App. 2010)).
19. Id. at 310 (citing Phillips v. ACS Mun. Brokers, Inc., 888 S.W.2d 872, 875 (Tex. App. 1994)).
20. Id (citing Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082 (2004)).
21. Id. at 309 (citing I.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223, 227 (Tex. 2003)).
22. Id. "[W]e determine the existence of an arbitration agreement based on Texas contract law
(citation omitted). The elements required for the formation of a valid contract are (1) an offer, (2)
acceptance in strict compliance with the terms of the offer, (3) a meeting of the minds, (4) each party's
consent to the terms, and (5) execution and delivery of the contract with the intent that it be mutual and
binding on the parties to the agreement. (citation omitted). Consideration is a fundamental element of
every valid contract." Id. (citing J.M. Davidson, 128 S.W.3d at 227; Gables Cent. Constr., Inc. v.
Atrium Cos., Inc., No. 05-07-00438-CV, 2009 WL 824732, at *2 (Tex. App. 2009) (mem. op.)).
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As evidence that the arbitration provision did not satisfy contract require-
ments, the court outlined the lack of assent between the parties allegedly bound by
the arbitration provision. 23 The court explained that because beneficiaries are not
signatories to the trusts from which they benefit,24 and because they are often not
involved in the creation of a trust, 25 they cannot be said to have assented to the
terms of a trust.26 According to the court, the relationship between a trust benefi-
ciary and trustee does not satisfy the contractual requirement of mutual assent
necessary to establish a valid arbitration agreement.27 As such, the court reasoned
that the relationships created by a trust "are not contractual" 2 8 and concluded that
a "trust is not a contract." 29 Thus, according to the court, arbitration provisions in
trust documents are unenforceable.3 0 Following the Court of Appeals' disposition
of his appeal, Mr. Rachal filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of
Texas. ' On June 8, 2012 the Texas Supreme Court granted review of the case,
which is still pending.32 In Rachal v. Reitz, the Texas Court of Appeals held that
because arbitration agreements are inherently contractual in nature, and because
trust documents do not create contractual relationships, mandatory arbitration
provisions found in trust documents are not enforceable against trustees or benefi-
ciaries.
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Trust law and arbitration law developed at different times in the history of
American jurisprudence and were developed to achieve different goals. Trust law
is centuries old and was established to aid in the transfer of property.34 Arbitration
law is still evolving and changing the mechanics of conflict resolution in Ameri-
ca.35 While these two areas of the law have not frequently intersected, they are not
mutually exclusive. This section first provides a brief background on the contrac-
tual nature of trust law, and how contract principles are utilized to effectuate set-
tlors' intent. Second, this section outlines arbitration's legal foundation in contract
law, and the enforceability of arbitration provisions. Third, the growing popularity
of using alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to resolve disputes of all types is
discussed. Next, the cases addressing the enforceability of trust arbitration provi-
sions, and relied on by the Rachal majority, are surveyed. Finally, this section
23. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 310 (citing Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1080 - 81).
24. Id. at 311.
25. Id.; see TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 112.001 (West 2007) (describing methods for creating a trust).
26. Id.
27. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 310.
28. Id. at 310.
29. Id. at 311.
30. Id.
31. Petition for Review, Rachal, 347 S.W.3d 305 (No. 05-09-01422-CV).
32. Id.
33. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 312 (citing Schoneberger v. Oclze, 96 P.3d 1078 (2004); Diaz v. Buckey,
125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 611-13, 615 (2011) for support).
34. ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS & ESTATES 75 (4th ed. 2009).
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reviews several recently enacted state statutes that make trust arbitration provi-
sions enforceable.
A. Contract Principles of Trust Law
The most commonly espoused theory of trusts is the donative theory. 36 The
donative theory of trusts became popular largely due to its adoption in the first
Restatement of Trusts, in 1935.37 The Reporter of the Restatement of Trusts, Aus-
tin Wakeman Scott, was a proponent of this theory and is largely credited with its
prevalence in American jurisprudence. Prior the publication of the Restatement,
American courts and commentators often cited trusts' contractual qualities, partic-
ularly in relation arbitration.39 However, while the "contractarian" theory of trusts
had significant support, the Restatement's emphasis on the donative theory made
it the predominate approach to trust law in the United States.40
While the donative theory of trusts is the most prominent, the contractual as-
pects of trust law have remained. Trust law is founded on the idea that courts
should uphold a settlor's unambiguous intent.4' As such, courts use common law
contract principles to ascertain the settlor's intent.42 Texas courts are no exception,
and have traditionally interpreted trusts as they do contracts.43 Texas courts look at
the four corners of the trust instrument," with the primary goal of determining the
intent of the trustor.45
Texas courts interpret contracts strictly, giving contract terms their literal, or-
dinary meaning, and enforcing the "clear, unambiguous provisions of a trust
agreement as they were written."46 If the terms of the trust are unambiguous, they
dictate the treatment of any matter provided for by the instrument.47 Under Texas
law, courts construe trust instruments "to give effect to all provisions so that no
provision is rendered meaningless." 4 8 Similarly, the Texas Trust Code recognizes
the primacy of the settlor's intent in construing the provisions of a trust instru-
ment.49
36. S.I. Strong, Arbitration of Trust Disputes: Two Bodies of Law Collide, 45 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 1157, 1174 (2012).
37. Id. at 1175; Barry L. Zins, Trustee Liability for Breach of the Duty of Loyalty: Good Faith In-
quiry and Appreciation Damages, 49 FORDHAM L. REv. 1012, 1013 n. 4 (1981), available at
http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edulflr/vol49/iss6/4.
38. Strong, supra note 36, at 1175.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 313 (2001); Stephen W. Murphy, Enforceable Arbitration
Clauses in Wills and Trusts: A Critique, 26 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 627, 652-57 (2011).
42. Id at 312-13.
43. Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App. 2007).
44. Id. at 367 (citing Eckels v. Davis, Ill S.W.3d 687, 694 (Tex. App. 2003)).
45. Id. at 366-67 (citing Hurley v. Moody Nat'l Bank of Galveston, 98 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App.
2003); Myrick v. Moody, 802 S.W.2d 735, 738 (Tex. App. 1990)).
46. Askanase v. LivingWell, Inc., 45 F.3d 103, 106 (5th Cir. 1995).
47. AUSTIN WAKEMAN SCorr & WILLIAM FRANKLIN FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 164.1 at
253 (4th ed. 1987).
48. Lesikar, 237 S.W.3d at 366-67 (citing Hurley, 90 S.W.3d at 310).
49. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 111.0035 (West) ("The terms of a trust prevail over any provision of
[the Texas Trust Code].").
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B. Contractual Nature ofArbitration Agreements
Arbitration grew out of contracting parties' desire to negotiate the terms un-
der which they would resolve future disputes.5 0 The enactment of the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA) in 192551 and the Supreme Court's subsequent expansion
of the FAA 52 have created a strong federal policy favoring arbitration. 53 Nine
states have enacted arbitration statutes modeled on the FAA. 54 In 1956, the Com-
missioner on Uniform State Laws established the Uniform Arbitration Act (UAA),
which varies only slightly from the FAA, and has been adopted by thirty-eight
states and the District of Columbia.55
Under the FAA, arbitration agreements must be "written provisions in . . . a
contract." 56 Under the more broadly worded UAA, arbitration provisions are only
enforceable if found in a "written agreement" or a "provision in a written con-
tract."5 7 As such, courts have construed state arbitration statutes that adopted the
UAA and FAA as requiring that arbitration provisions be part of a valid contract.5 8
Accordingly, American courts utilize state common law contract principles when
deciding whether the parties to a written agreement agreed to arbitrate future dis-
putes arising from it.59
The Supreme Court affirmed the contractual nature of arbitration in AT&T
Technologies, Inc. v. Communications Workers of America.60 The Supreme Court
explained that "[a]rbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required
to submit to arbitration any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit."6' In the
2010 case Rent-A-Center, West v. Jackson, the United States Supreme Court rein-
forced that "[t]he FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a mat-
ter of contract." 62 However, the Supreme Court has been very liberal in its appli-
50. Murphy, supra note 41, at 631-32.
51. Pub. L. No. 68-401, 43 Stat. 883 (1925) (codified as amended at 9 U.S.C. §H 1-14 (2006)).
52. See Moses H. Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 11 (1984); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,
473 U.S. 614, 627 (1985).
53. Moses H. Cone Mem 'I Hosp., 460 U.S. at 24.
54. Murphy, supra note 41, at 640.
55. Id. Only three states, Alabama, New Hampshire, and West Virginia, have adopted arbitration
statutes not based on either the Uniform or Federal Acts. Id. at 681 n.55.
56. Id ("[a] written provision in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction
involving commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising . . . or . . . an existing
controversy . .. shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable. . . ." (citing 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2011))).
57. Id. at 640 n. 56 ("[a] written agreement to submit any existing controversy to arbitration or a
provision in a written contract to submit to arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties is valid, enforceable and irrevocable . . . ." Id. (quoting Unif. Arbitration Act § 1 (1956))). See
also Rev. Unif. Arbitration Act § 6(a) (2000) ("An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbi-
tration any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the parties to the agreement is valid,
enforceable, and irrevocable. . . ."). Id.
58. Id. at 64-41.
59. Molly Buck Richard, Alternative Dispute Resolution-Arbitration-Agreements to Arbitrate, I
TEX. PRAc. GUIDE BUS. TRANS. § 1:106 (West 2012) (citing In re Dillard Dept. Stores, Inc., 186
S.W.3d 514, 515 (Tex. 2006)). State common law contract principles vary by state, but generally focus
on the mutual assent of the parties to the terms of a written agreement. Id.
60. AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648-49 (1986).
61. Id.
62. Rent-A-Ctr., W., Inc. v. Jackson, 130 S. Ct. 2772, 2776 (2010) (citing Moses H. Cone Memorial
Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
No. I] 217
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cation of this "fundamental principle." The Court has found valid arbitration
agreements in "mere written agreements,"63 and other documents that were not
valid contracts. 6 In fact, the Supreme Court has not interpreted "contract" as
narrowly as the Rachal majority, and, as a result, has not required that an arbitra-
tion clause appear in an overarching. contract.65 Similarly, lower federal courts
have upheld arbitration agreements found in instruments that were not contracts,
allowing the arbitration clause to "stand alone." 66
Rooted in the language of the UAA and FAA, state arbitration statutes are
equally prone to contradictory interpretation. Some state statutes require only a
written agreement to arbitrate, while others require an "arbitration contract." 67
While several states do not require that parties to an arbitration agreement sign the
agreement,6 8 all states require that arbitration provisions be in writing69 and evi-
dence the parties' mutual assent and intent to be bound.o
C. The Preference for ADR
The past several decades have seen an escalation in the use of alternative dis-
pute resolution (ADR), such as arbitration, to resolve legal claims. 7 1 As litigation
becomes increasingly ubiquitous, expensive, and time consuming, 72 parties in-
creasingly prefer to use arbitration to resolve a growing variety of legal disputes. 73
Federal support of arbitration has become pervasive, with both state and federal
courts adopting the "liberal federal policy favoring arbitration." 74 As arbitration
becomes more popular, courts are asked to enforce arbitration agreements found
in a variety of legal instruments, and between parties with complicated legal rela-
tionships.75 In doing so, courts must not only interpret and construe arbitration
agreements in conformity with the state law and precedent, but they must also
consider which legal disputes are best suited for ADR.
63. Id. at 2781-82. As a result of these holdings, some commentators argue that "the fact that state
law insists that an arbitration clause appear in a 'contract' is irrelevant for the purposes of the FAA."
Horton, supra note 35, at 1028-30.
64. Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 448 (2006).
65. Horton, supra note 35, at 1055-56.
66. Patterson v. Tenet Healthcare, Inc., 113 F.3d 832, 835 (8th Cir. 1997).
67. Rev. Unif. Arbitration Act § 1 (2000); 9 U.S.C. § 2 (1947).
68. Bridas S.A.P.I.C. v. Gov't of Turkmenistan, 345 F.3d 347, 356 (5th Cir. 2003) (discussing
various theories for binding non-signatories to arbitration agreements under common law contract
principles).
69. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).
70. Gables Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Atrium Cos., Inc., No. 050700438 CV, 2009 WL 824732, at *2
(Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2009) (reciting requisite contract elements of arbitration agreements, including
offer, acceptance, mutual assent, consent to the terms, and execution and delivery of the arbitration
agreement).
71. Michael P. Bruyere & Meghan D. Marino, Mandatory Arbitration Provisions: A Powerful Tool
to Prevent Contentions and Costly Trust Litigation, But Are They Enforceable?, 42 REAL PROP. PROB.
& TR. J. 351, 352 (2007).
72. Horton, supra note 35, at 1029-30.
73. Id.
74. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1745 (2011) (citing Moses H. Cone
Mem'1 Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24 (1983)).
75. Horton, supra note 35, at 1028-29.
76. Murphy, supra note 41, at 671.
218 [Vol. 2013
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The increasing popularity of arbitration has led it to be used to settle a grow-
ing variety of disputes and has led to the inclusion of arbitration agreements in
documents other than traditional contracts. The inclusion of arbitration agree-
ments in these documents creates a question of enforceability and is the basis of
the dispute in Rachal v. Reitz.
With the increase in arbitration across all legal disputes, the use of arbitration
provisions is becoming popular among estate planners. Estates and Trusts lawyers
realize the benefits that arbitration offers their clients, who frequently want to
avoid intra-family conflict.78 Thus, the inclusion of arbitration provisions in wills
and trusts is on the rise. Clients seeking estate planning assistance are often par-
ticularly interested in confidentiality, privacy, maintaining family relationships,
and avoiding costly, estate-diminishing litigation. Arbitration provisions allow
Estates and Trusts lawyers to allay all of these concerns.79
D. The Enforceability of Trust Arbitration Provisions: Case Law
While the Supreme Court has enforced extra-contractual arbitration provi-
sions under the FAA, 80 state courts have centered their analysis around state con-
tract law and have largely "insist[ed] that an arbitration clause appear in a 'con-
tract."'81 As more states address the enforceability of trust arbitration provisions,
this conservative approach has begun to wane, 82 aided by the enactment of a
growing number of state trust arbitration statutes, discussed infra.x However, the
holding in Rachal v. Reitz is consistent with the traditional tendency of state courts
to strike down arbitration provisions found outside of a contract.
In Rachal v. Reitz, the Texas court of appeals faced the question of whether a
mandatory arbitration provision included in a trust document is enforceable
against beneficiaries of the trust. 4 This was an issue of first impression in Texas,
and one that had previously been addressed by only two other states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia.85 Prior to Rachal, the Arizona and California Courts of Appeals
considered the enforceability of trust arbitration provisions, finding trust arbitra-
tion provisions unenforceable.86 The reasoning in both the Arizona and California
opinions focused on the legal distinctions between trusts and contracts, and the
contractual nature of arbitration agreements.87
77. Horton, supra note 35, at 1030.
78. Murphy, supra note 41, at 635-36.
79. Id
80. See supra notes 64-66.
81. See supra notes 57-58, and accompanying text.
82. See generally, Bruyere & Marino, supra note 71; Murphy, supra note 41.
83. See discussion, infra notes 1 11-130.
84. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. App. 2011).
85. Id. "[W]hether a provision stating the settlor's intent that disputes involving the trust be resolved
by arbitration is enforceable as in a contract is an issue of first impression in Texas. Indeed, only two
jurisdictions in the country have considered a similar issue." Id. (referring to Schoneberger v. Oelze,
96 P.3d 1078 (2004) and Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 611-13, 615 (2011)). See also In re
Mary Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
86. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 310.
87. Id. at 310-11.
No. 1] 219
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In 2004, the Arizona Court of Appeals was the first court to decide the en-
forceability of trust arbitration provisions, in Schoneberger v. Oelze. 88 The facts
of Schoneberger were similar to those in Rachal v. Reitz. In Schoneberger, the
beneficiaries of a trust brought an action against the trustee for breach of trust and
related torts.8 9 The trustee moved to compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration
provision contained in the trust.90 The beneficiaries argued in response that the
arbitration provision was unenforceable because it was not contained in a contract,
because trusts are not contracts. 91 Additionally, the beneficiaries argued that as
non-signatories to the trust documents, they had never agreed to arbitrate their
claims under the trust. 92
The Arizona Court of Appeals found the arbitration provision unenforceable,
reasoning that "[a]rbitration is a creature of contract law" and the "relationships
that arise out of a trust are 'not contractual."' 93 Every court to address this issue
subsequently has relied on this reasoning, and the Schoneberger opinion specifi-
cally.94 Accordingly, every state court to address the enforceability of trust arbitra-
tion provisions has found them unenforceable. 95 Responding to the Schoneberger
holding, the Arizona legislature passed a statute making trust arbitration provi-
sions enforceable in 2008.96 Thus, the Schoneberger opinion was made obsolete
three years before the Texas Court of Appeals adopted its reasoning in the 2011
Rachal v. Reitz opinion.
In 2011, the same year that Rachal v. Reitz was decided in Texas, the Califor-
nia Second Court of Appeal became the first California court to decide the en-
forceability of trust arbitration provisions.97 Again, relying on the Arizona court's
Schoneberger analysis, the California court focused on the distinctions between a
contract and a trust. 98 The court held that the trust arbitration provision at issue
was unenforceable against a beneficiary who did not agree to arbitrate disputes
arising from the trust, and that such a beneficiary could not be compelled to arbi-
trate because a trust is not a contract. 99
88. Id. at 310. "The issue was first considered by the Arizona Court of Appeals in Schoneberger v.
Oelze, 208 Ariz. 591, 96 P.3d 1078 (2004)." Id.
89. Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1080.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1080-81.
92. Id.
93. Id at 1082 (quoting AT & T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S. 643, 648
(1986) and In re Naarden Trust, 990 P.2d 1085, 1088-89 (1999) (distinguishing a trust from a con-
tract)).
94. See generally Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 311 (Tex. App. 2011); Diaz v. Buckey, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 610, 611-13, 615 (2011); In re Mary Calomiris, 894 A.2d 408, 410 (D.C. 2006). In 2006, the
District of Columbia relied on Arizona's Schoneberger holding in ruling that arbitration provisions in
wills are similarly unenforceable. 94 In In re Mary Calomiris, the D.C. Court of Appeals found the
Arizona court's reasoning "instructive" and concluded that "just as a trust is not a contract, 'a will is
not a contract either."' In re Mary Calomiris, 894 A.2d at 409.
95. Id.
96. See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (West, Westlaw through Ist & 2d Spec. Sess. 2011)
(stating that a "trust instrument may provide mandatory, exclusive and reasonable procedures to re-
solve issues between the trustee and interested persons . . . with regard to the administration or distri-
bution of the trust").
97. Diaz, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 611-13, 615.
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E. Statutory Approaches
The sparse case law addressing the enforceability of trust arbitration provi-
sions may be responsible for state courts' tendency to narrowly interpret their
arbitration statutes to require that arbitration agreements exist in a valid con-
tract.'00 As such, many states have recognized the need for statutory reform in this
area.'o Several states have revised their arbitration statutes to make arbitration
provisions found in legal instruments, other than contracts, enforceable.' 0 2 As
arbitration's popularity continues to grow, arbitration provisions will likely be
included in more and more trust documents. States with large populations of sen-
ior citizens and states hoping to draw trust business will likely begin revising their
arbitration statutes in increasing numbers every year.103
The legislatures of all fifty states have enacted statutes allowing trustees to
use arbitration to resolve trust disputes.'0 However, the language of all but two of
these statutes requires that parties to a trust agree to use arbitration to resolve their
disputes.' 0 5 While the majority of state arbitration statutes merely grant trustees
the power to resolve trust disputes using ADR,1 06 a few states have enacted legis-
lation specifically aimed at promoting the use of arbitration in trust and other pro-
bate disputes.107
In 2005, Hawaii became the first state to propose a trust-specific arbitration
statute. 0 8 Senator Suzanna Chun Oakland co-sponsored a bill that would have
made trust arbitration provisions enforceable in Hawaii.109 Hawaii was motivated
by a desire to create a dispute resolution system that would minimize contentious
trust litigation for its large, aging senior population.lo Unfortunately, the bill
lacked a champion and died in committee before ever being brought to a vote."'
In 2004, the American College of Trusts and Estate Counsel (ACTEC)112
formed a task force to address the inclusion of arbitration provisions in testamen-
100. Strong, supra note 36, at 1247-48.
101. Murphy, supra note 41, at 662-70.
102. Id. (reviewing and analyzing such statutory reforms). Missouri is currently finalizing such a
statute, which may be enacted in 2013. Interview with Scott Martinsen, author of the proposed Mis-
souri statute (October 25, 2012).
103. Murphy, supra note 41, at 669.
104. Bruyere & Marino, supra note 71, at 355 n. 13 (listing state statutes granting trustees the power
to utilize ADR to resolve trust disputes).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 355.
107. See ALASKA CT. R. 4.5 (2006); HAW. PROB. R. 2.1 (2007); MASS. PROB. & FAM. CT., Standing
Order 1-04 (2006); MICH. CT. R. 5.143 (2006); N.J. CT. R. 1:40-6 (2007); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
11.96A.260 (West 2006).
108. Probate Code Mediation and Arbitration Choice Act, S.B. 1314, 23d. Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw.
2005).
109. Murphy, supra note 41, at 663.
110. Id. at 663-64. Hawaii has a large population of senior citizens, which boasts "the highest longev-
ity in the nation and largest growth in our in our elders per capita (growing rate of 300% for 85-year-
olds and older)." Id. In proposing the statute, the Hawaii legislature was "trying to be proactive in
addressing many aging issues," by "looking at mediation and less contentious forms of problem solv-
ing in the legal system." Id.
111. Id. at 664.
112. Id. at 665. ACTEC is a nonprofit association of trust and estate lawyers who "have made sub-
stantial contributions to the field of trusts and estates law through writing, teaching and bar leadership
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tary instruments." 3 The Task Force concluded that the legislative action is the
most expeditious and effective way for states to ensure the enforceability of their
citizens' trust arbitration provisions.114 The Task Force proposed a "Model Act,"
with suggested statutory provisions, for adoption by states. The Model Act includ-
ed two key elements. First, it made trust and will provisions requiring arbitration
of disputes between, or among, trustees and beneficiaries enforceable." 5 Second,
and unlike the proposed Hawaii bill, the ACTEC Model Act limited the scope of
enforceable trust arbitration provisions. The Model Act only enforced arbitration
provisions requiring arbitration of disputes regarding the interpretation of the trust
and the fiduciary duty of the trustee."16 The Model Act would not enforce arbitra-
tion provisions that sound to govern disputes regarding the validity of the trust."
Washington was the next state to pass a trust arbitration statute, the Trust and
Estate Dispute Resolution Act, in 2006.1' The statute grants any party the right to
use ADR to resolve trust disputes before filing suit in court, and provides direc-
tions on utilizing ADR." 9 However, while the Washington statute was the first
trust arbitration statute to be successfully enacted, it does not, on its own, make
arbitration provisions in trust documents enforceable.120 Under the Washington
statute, the parties to the dispute must still enter a written arbitration agreement
before they will be compelled to arbitrate trust disputes. Additionally, Washington
courts must make the ultimate decision to order arbitration of a dispute, regardless
of the inclusion of an arbitration provision in a trust. 121
In 2007, Florida became the first state to enact a trust arbitration statute mod-
eled after the ACTEC Model Act.122 Similar to the Model Act, the Florida statute
makes trust and will arbitration provisions requiring arbitration of future trust
disputes enforceable against beneficiaries and trustees.' 23 The Florida statute ex-
activities." THE AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRUST AND ESTATE COUNSEL,
http://www.actec.org/public/AboutACTEC.asp (last visited on Aug. 22, 2012).
113. Id at664.
114. Bridget A. Logstrom, Resolving Disputes with Ease and Grace, 31 ACTEC J. 235, 238 (2005).
115. Murphy, supra note 41, at 664 (citing ACTEC Arbitration Task Force Report, at *27 (Sept. 15,
2006), available at http://www2.mnbar.org/sections/probate-
trust/ACTEC%20Arbitration%2OTask%2OForce%20Report-2006.pdf
116. ACTEC Arbitration Task Force Report, at *14.
117. Id. at 6 n.2. "If [a will or trust] contest takes the form of an attack on the validity of the whole
will or trust, including the arbitration clause (e.g. testamentary capacity), then the matter will be heard
by the court, not the arbitrator, whose very power is at issue. See Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood &
Conklin Manufacturing Co., 388 U.S. 395, 403-04 (1967). On the other hand, if the arbitration clause
is attacked as being the product of fraud or undue influence, then arbitration under an otherwise appro-
priate clause remains extant." Id.
118. Trust and Estates Dispute Resolution Act, WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 11.96A.260 to 11.96A.320
(2009).
119. Id at § I 1.96A.310(3). "Objection to arbitration. A party may object to arbitration by filing a
petition with the superior court and serving the petition on all parties or the parties' virtual representa-
tives.'. . . . [T]he court shall order that arbitration proceed except for good cause shown. Such order
shall not be subject to appeal or revision. If the court determines that the matter should not be subject
to arbitration, the court shall dispose of the matter by: (a) Deciding the matter at that hearing, but only
if the petition objecting to arbitration contains a request for such relief, or (b) directing other judicial
proceedings." Id.
120. See id § I l.96A.310(5)(f).
12 1. Id.
122. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (2010); Murphy, supra note 41, at 665.
123. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 731.401 (2010).
222 [Vol. 2013
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2013, Iss. 1 [2013], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2013/iss1/11
You Can't Have Your Trust and Defeat It Too
plicitly excludes disputes over the validity of the donative instrument from arbitra-
tion. 124 The Florida statute was, therefore, the first state statute to truly make trust
arbitration provisions enforceable.
In 2008, Arizona's legislature overturned Schoneberger when it enacted a
new statute making ADR provisions in trusts enforceable.125 Like the Florida stat-
ute, the Arizona statute does not enforce arbitration provisions that require arbitra-
tion of the validity of a trust document. 126 However, the Arizona statute differs
from the Florida statute in that it pertains only to trusts, and not wills.1 27 Addition-
ally, unlike the Florida statute, which specifically references "arbitration," the
Arizona statute is broader. The Arizona statute mandates the enforcement of arbi-
tration provisions, or any other "reasonable procedures" to resolve trust disputes,
as indicated in the trust instrument.128
Many commentators, state legislatures, and courts believe that statutory re-
form is necessary to make trust arbitration provisions fully enforceable.' 29 Many
commentators believe that such legislative action is the most effective and reliable
way to guarantee the enforceability of such trust arbitration provisions.'30 Schone-
berger was the first case to address the enforceability of trust arbitration provi-
sions, and it served as a compass for state courts across the country that have
struck down trust arbitration provisions. 131 Despite the fact that the Schoneberger
opinion was superseded by statute three years before Rachal v. Reitz was decided,
the Texas court adopted Schoneberger's interpretation of Arizona's since-
superseded arbitration statute.132 As a result, Rachal v. Reitz held that because
arbitration agreements are inherently contractual in nature, and because a trust
does not contractually bind its beneficiaries, mandatory arbitration provisions
found in trust documents are not enforceable against trustees or beneficiaries.'3 3
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Majority Opinion
Rachel v. Reitz presented an issue of first impression in Texas. 134 Presiding en
banc, the Texas Court of Appeals held that the mandatory arbitration provision
found in the trust at issue was not enforceable against trustees, beneficiaries, or
other interested parties.13 5 Relying on the reasoning of the Arizona Court of Ap-
124. Id
125. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (West, Westlaw through Ist & 2d Spec. Sess. 2011).
126. Murphy, supra note 41, at 666.
127. Id.
128. Id. (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14-10205).
129. See generally Murphy, supra note 41; ACTEC Arbitration Task Force Report, supra note 103;
Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 312 (Tex. App. 2011).
130. See, e.g., Bruyere & Marino, supra note 71, at 364; Murphy, supra note 41, at 634.
131. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 310 (Tex. App. 2011). See also, supra notes 94-95 and ac-
companying text.
132. Id at 311.
133. Id. at 311-12 (citing Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (2004) and Diaz v. Buckey, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 610, 611-13, 615 (2011) for support).
134. Id. at 310.
135. Rachal, 247 S.W.3d at 311.
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peals' Schoneberger opinion, the Texas court reasoned that because arbitration
provisions are governed by contract law, parties who do not directly assent to such
provisions are not bound by them.136
The court first analyzed the TAA,13 7 under which Rachal moved to compel
arbitration. 138 Under the TAA, an enforceable arbitration agreement must exist
before a court will compel arbitration.1 39 The court explained that "[i]t is a founda-
tional principle that a party cannot be compelled to arbitrate a dispute when the
party has not agreed to do so."l140 When analyzing the validity of arbitration
agreements, Texas courts "apply standard contract principles and do not resolve
doubts or indulge a presumption in favor of arbitration."' 4 1 These contract princi-
ples, required for the formation of a valid contract, include: an offer; acceptance
"in strict compliance with the terms of the offer;" a "meeting of the minds;" mutu-
al assent; and execution and delivery of the contract, with the understanding and
desire that the contract be binding on both parties to the agreement.142
In a single paragraph, the court analyzed the trust according to contract prin-
ciples and concluded that the trust document did not satisfy Texas common law
contract principles.14 3 The court reasoned that proof of the settlor's intent that
trust disputes be arbitrated is not enough to demonstrate mutual assent to an arbi-
tration agreement. 14 To substantiate its finding that no agreement to arbitrate
existed, the court noted that it was "undisputed that neither Rachal nor Reitz
signed the trust document as parties to the trust." 45 The court further stated that
Rachal's motion to compel arbitration did not explain how the trust settlor's intent
that trust disputes be arbitrated transformed into mutual assent to arbitrate be-
tween Rachal and Reitz. As such, the court concluded that no agreement to arbi-
trate existed between Rachal and Reitz, and refused to enforce the trust's arbitra-
tion provision.146
The bulk of the majority opinion is dedicated to a discussion of the Schone-
berger and Diaz opinions.147 The Texas Court of Appeals' opinion assumed the
Arizona court's distinction between a trust and a contract, tracking the language of
the Schoneberger opinion closely.14 8 Cting Rachal's failure to establish how the
arbitration provision satisfied all of the required elements of a contract, or how the
settlor's intent "transformed" the arbitration provision into an agreement between
136. Id.
137. See TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 171.001-.098 (West 2005).
138. Rachal, 247 S.W.3d at 308.
139. Id. (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 171.021(a)).
140. Id (citing Roe v. Ladymon, 318 S.W.3d 502, 510 (Tex. App. 2010)).
141. Id (citing J.M. Davidson, Inc. v. Webster, 128 S.W.3d 223,227 (Tex. 2003)).
142. Id at 309 (citing Gables Cent. Constr., Inc. v. Atrium Cos., Inc., No. 050700438 CV, 2009 WL
824732, at *2 (Tex. App. Mar. 31, 2009) (enumerating the required elements of a contract under Texas
law)).
143. Rachal, 247 S.W.3d at 311-12.
144. Id. at 309-10 (explaining that "Rachal did not establish how the settlor's expression of intent
satisfied all of the required elements of a contract or how this expression of the settlor's intent trans-
formed the trust provision into an agreement to arbitrate between Rachal and Reitz").
145. Id. at 309.
146. Id. at 312.
147. Id. at 310-11.
148. Rachal, 247 S.W.3d at 310-11.
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Rachal and Reitz,149 the court refused to enforce the arbitration provision.5 o The
court concluded that arbitration is a "creature of contract law," and because a
"trust is not a contract," mandatory arbitration provisions found in trust documents
are not enforceable.' 5 1
The majority opinion closed by noting that the issue presented in Rachal v.
Reitz was better suited for determination by the Texas legislature. 152
B. Dissenting Opinion
Four judges dissented from the majority opinion in Rachal v. Reitz,153 creat-
ing a "badly divided court." 54 The dissent argued that Rachal satisfied the burden
of proof when he provided the court with a copy of the trust arbitration provisions,
establishing the existence of an enforceable arbitration agreement under the
trust.' 5 5 The dissent found the majority's focus on whether the arbitration provi-
sion satisfied the require elements of a contract to be misplaced. 5 6
The dissent began by arguing that the enforceability of the arbitration provi-
sions was not even at issue in the case.15 7 The dissent noted that Reitz had, in fact,
claimed to be a party to the trust agreement itself when he asserted his standing as
a party and beneficiary to the trust in his initial complaint. 5 8 Additionally, the
dissent emphasized that Reitz never contested the validity of the trust arbitration
provision or its enforceability against him.'5 9 Reitz's initial complaint against
Rachal sought to enforce the trust, not to contest its terms. 6 0 That Reitz sought to
enforce the terms of the trust led the dissent to its next argument: one seeking to
benefit under a trust cannot simultaneously deny the enforceability of certain trust
terms.' 6'
The dissent next argued that the language of the TAA does not require an ar-
bitration contract, but simply "a written agreement to arbitrate." 62 The dissenting
justices distinguished the TAA from the since-revised Arizona arbitration statute
149. Id. at 309-10.
150. Id. at 311-12.
151. Id. (citing Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1083 (2004); Diaz v. Buckey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d
610, 611-13, 615 (2011)).
152. Id.
153. Rachal v. Reitz was before the court en banc, with twelve of the Texas Fifth District Court of
Appeals' thirteen justices presiding. Id. at 307. Three judges joined Justice Murphy's dissenting
opinion. Id. at 312.
154. Ronald R. Volkmer, Validity of Trust Arbitration Provision, 39 EST. PLN. 47,47 (2012).
155. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 312 (Murphy, J., dissenting). According to the dissent, Rachal satisfied
his burden procedurally, as the party seeking to compel arbitration satisfies his burden if he provides
the court with a copy of an agreement to arbitrate. Id.
156. Id. at 314.
157. Id. at 312.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 312.
161. Id at 313 (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith v. Eddings, 838 S.W.2d 874, 880 (Tex.
App. 1992) (party opposing arbitration would have no claims but for agreement containing arbitration
provision); see also Meyer v. WMCO-GP, LLC, 211 S.W.3d 302, 307 (Tex. 2006) ("When a party's
right to recover and its damages depend on the agreement containing the arbitration provision, the
party is relying on the agreement for its claims.").
162. Id. (citing TEx. Cv. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 171.001(a) (emphasis added)).
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relied on in Schoneberger, which required that arbitration agreements be con-
tained in a contract.'6 3 Neither the TAA, nor the California arbitration statute cited
in Diaz, requires the existence of an "arbitration contract." Both statutes require
only a "written agreement to arbitrate" any existing or future controversy between
the parties to the agreement.16 Thus, according to the dissent, both the Texas and
California courts misappropriated the stricter requirements of the Arizona statute
in adopting its reasoning.' 6 5 As such, the dissent agreed that the majority's reli-
ance on the Arizona case was misguided. 6 According to the dissent, the majori-
ty's analysis of the TAA misinterpreted the meaning of the statute, and impermis-
sibly narrowed its application. 167
The Rachal dissent also emphasized the importance of enforcing a settlor's
intent when construing a trust. While courts interpret trusts as they would con-
tracts,'16 the dissent urged that a court's primary concern in construing a trust is to
determine and effectuate the settlor's intent.1 69 The dissent emphasized that courts
must construe trusts to give effect to each term of the trust, such that no term is
rendered meaningless, 170 and that when the settlor's intent is unambiguous, con-
struction of a trust is a question of law for the court.1 7 1 Noting that, in the instant
case, the settlor's intent was neither ambiguous nor contested, the dissent disa-
greed with the majority's refusal to uphold the settlor's intent. 172
Ultimately, Rachal v. Reitz held that because arbitration agreements are in-
herently contractual in nature, and because trust documents are not trusts and
therefore do not create contractual relationships, mandatory arbitration provisions
found in trust documents are not enforceable. 7 3
V. COMMENT
In Rachal v. Reitz, the Texas Court of Appeals addressed the enforceability of
trust arbitration provisions for the first time. The majority opinion adopted the
reasoning of the Arizona Court of Appeals' Schoneberger opinion, ruling trust
arbitration provisions unenforceable.' 74 In so holding, the Texas Court of Appeals
relied on what commentators have referred to as the "thin and underdeveloped"
163. Id. at 314.
164. Id. at 313-14.
165. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 313-14.
166. Id
167. Id
168. Id. at 312-13 (citing Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App. 2007)).
169. Id. at 313 (citing Smith v. Moore, 425 S.W.2d 856, 862 (Tex. App. 1969)). "A fundamental
principle of trust law requires that we apply contract rules of interpretation and enforce trust agree-
ments based on the settlor's intent." Id at 313 (citing Lesikar, 237 S.W.3d at 366; Smith, 425 S.W.2d
at 862).
170. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 313.
17 1. Id.
172. Id. at 314.
173. Id. at 311-12 (citing Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078 (Ariz. 2004) and Diaz v. Buckey, 125
Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 611-13, 615 (2011) for support).
174. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 310-11.
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precedent on this issue. 75 The Texas court did not consider the differences be-
tween the arbitration statutes in Arizona and Texas.176 The majority in Rachal
failed to address the nuanced relationship between trust and contract law.' 77 As a
result, the court did not consider alternative interpretations of the TAA and Texas
contract law that would have allowed the court to enforce the arbitration provi-
sion. Any of these considerations might have enabled the Rachal court to effectu-
ate the settlor's intent.
A. Arbitration under the TAA
The Rachal court adopted the reasoning of the Schoneberger opinion, holding
that because a trust is not a contract, trust arbitration provisions do not satisfy
contract principles and are therefore unenforceable. 78 This analysis misconstrues
the TAA.'79 The Schoneberger and Diaz opinions both turned on the distinction
between contracts and trust instruments. 80 The Schoneberger opinion cited the
specific language of the Arizona arbitration statute then in effect for authority.' 8 1
The Arizona arbitration statute requires proof of an enforceable "arbitration con-
tract," under which parties agree to arbitrate future disputes.1 82 In Arizona, an
arbitration agreement itself must be a contract, and must therefore independently
satisfy the required elements of contract formation to be enforceable. 83 While
these requirements may have existed under Arizona's prior arbitration statute,
they do not exist under the TAA.
The Rachal majority construed the broad language of the TAA as though it
were as narrow as the Arizona statute. However, unlike the Arizona arbitration
statute, the TAA requires only agreements to arbitrate.'84 While the distinction
between "agreement" and "contract" may seem purely semantic, statutory lan-
guage must be interpreted according to its plain meaning.' 85 The Texas legisla-
175. S.I. Strong, Mandatory Arbitration of Internal Trust Disputes: Improving Arbitrability and
Enforceability Through Proper Procedural Choices, 28 ARB. INT'L _, at *29 (forthcoming 2012),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract-2046828.
176. It should also be noted that the Arizona decision upon which the Rachal court relied had previ-
ously been superseded by statute. Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d 1078, 1082 (Ariz. 2004), supersed-
ed by statute, 2008 ARIZ. SESS. LAWS, ch. 247, § 16 (2d Reg. Sess.) (current version at ARIz. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 14-10205 (West, Westlaw through Feb. 2011 Sess.). Additionally, Diaz v. Bukey, the
California decision cited for support by the Rachal court has since been depublished by the Supreme
Court of California, and may no longer be cited as precedent by California courts, pending final review
by the state's supreme court. Diaz v. Bukey, 195 Cal. App. 4th 315, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (2011), as
modified on denial of reh'g (June 8, 2011), review granted and opinion superseded, 257 P.3d 1129
(Cal. 2011).
177. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 313 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (citing Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361,
366 (Tex. App. 2007)).
178. Id at 311-12.
179. Id at 313.
180. Id at 310-11.
181. Schoneberger, 96 P.3d at 1083.
182. Id. at 1080.
183. Id at 1082.
184. TEx. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 17 1.001(a) (emphasis added).
185. Garcia v. State, 172 S.W.3d 270, 272-73 (Tex. App. 2005) (citing Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d
782, 785 (Tex. App. 1991) ("In construing a statute, the reviewing court's goal is to effectuate the
intent of the Legislature. [Id.] The literal text of a statute is generally the only definitive evidence of
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ture's decision to use the broader, less restrictive term "agreement" may indicate
that the legislature intended to allow arbitration agreements to exist in agreements
other than contracts. The broad language of the TAA has enabled Texas courts to
find valid arbitration agreements in documents other than contracts.186 The Texas
legislature's decision to use this broader term may indicate that the distinction
between trusts and contracts in Texas is not so stark as it was in Arizona, and that
the relationship between arbitration agreements and contracts need not be ana-
lyzed as narrowly as it was by the Rachal court.
B. Approaches to Trust Law
The Rachal majority's analysis was based entirely on the donative theory of
trusts. Although the donative approach is very common, trusts can also be ana-
lyzed as contractual instruments under the contract theory of trusts."' While a
trust conveys a donative transfer, it is also contract-like. 8 9 A trust is an agreement
between a settlor and a trustee.190 And trust instruments, often replete with signed
written agreements, exchanges of promises, and payment of consideration,191 can
create binding agreements between these parties.192
The Reporter of the Restatement of Trusts,' 93 Austin Scott, has said that he
did not distinguish trusts from contracts in the Restatement because they are in-
compatible or antithetical legal instruments, but rather, out of a desire to keep trust
disputes out of the hands of the jury, and protected by the "nurturing hand of the
specialist equity bench." 94 Thus, procedural desires, rather than substantive law,
may have been responsible for the distinction between trusts and contracts enunci-
ated in the Restatement, and subsequently relied on by courts in holding that "a
trust is not a contract."19 5 This insight into the distinction made in the Restatement
and the Reporter's desire to protect trusts disputes from jury consideration are
completely consistent with the use of arbitration to settle trust disputes. Arbitra-
tion offers a more "protective," confidential and relationship-focused approach to
the Legislature's intent. Id Therefore, we must ordinarily apply the 'plain meaning rule,' that is, we
must give effect to the statute's plain meaning. Id.")).
186. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 313 (citing Wiley v. Bertelsen, 770 S.W.2d 878, 882 (Tex. App. 1989)).
187. Id. at 309-12. The majority opinion in Rachal considers only the donative theory of trusts,
emphasizing the unilateral transfer of property under trusts, and that, unlike a contract, consideration is
not required for the formation of a trust. Id. at 311.
188. Strong, supra note 36, at 1177.
189. Id. (citing Langbein, supra note 169, at 185).
190. Id at 1177.
191. Id. at 1176-78.
192. Id. at 1228 (citing John H. Langbein, The Contractarian Basis of the Law of Trusts, 105 YALE
L.J. 625, 627 (1995)). "An arbitral clause in a trust is considered operable with respect to trustees ...
to the extent that those persons agree to act under the terms of the trust, whether that agreement is
reflected in the trust itself or in an accompanying document." Id. (citing Tina Wuistemann, Arbitration
of Trust Disputes, in NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 2007, 33,
40 (Christoph MOller ed., 2007)).
193. The Restatement of Trusts has been cited by many courts for authority that a trust is not a con-
tract. In fact, the Schoneberger opinion relied heavily on the Restatement in finding that arbitration
agreements cannot exist in trusts because a trust is not a contract. See Schoneberger v. Oelze, 96 P.3d
1078, 1082-83 (Ariz. 2004).
194. Strong, supra note 36, at 1175.
195. Schoneberg, 96 P.3d at 1083; Diaz v. Bukey, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 615 (2011).
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dispute resolution, making it ideally suited to trust disputes.'96 Thus, it is possible
that the laws governing trusts and arbitration are not so diametrically opposed as
the Rachal majority argues.' 97 Trusts' contract-like qualities, and such commen-
tary on the legal basis for distinguishing trusts and contracts have led some com-
mentators to argue that there are "no good current policy grounds for permitting
the inclusion of arbitration clauses in contracts but not trust [instruments]." 98
C. Contract Principles and Trusts in Texas
Courts misconstrue arbitration statutes when they interpret them to require
strict compliance with all required contract elements.'" The Rachal majority
narrowly construed "written agreement" under the TAA, requiring that arbitration
agreements exist in contracts. The court reasoned that because arbitration agree-
ments are analyzed using contract principles, they must satisfy all of the require-
ments of a contract, or be contained in an overarching contract to be valid.2 00 Ac-
cordingly, the court argued that because a "trust is not a contract," arbitration
agreements in trust documents are unenforceable.20' The Rachal court failed to
address the fact that Texas courts use contract principles not only to interpret arbi-
tration agreements, but also in analyzing trust documents. 202
The fact that Texas courts analyze trusts instruments and arbitration agree-
ments using the same contract principles seems to contradict the Rachal majori-
ty's holding that the contractual nature of arbitration agreements makes them in-
compatible with trust instruments. Trusts instruments, while contract-like in many
ways, need not to satisfy all of the elements of a contract in order to establish a
valid trust.203 The validity of a legal instrument can be analyzed using contract
principles without the instrument having to actually be a contract. Thus, an arbi-
tration agreement may also be analyzed using contract principles without having
to satisfy all of contract requirements, and without having to actually be a con-
tract. Accordingly, arbitration agreements do not have to be contained within a
"contract," but can exist within a written agreement that does not violate common
law contract principles.
196. Strong, supra note 36, at 1175.
197. Id. Several of the reasons given by Austin Scott, the Reporter of the Restatement of Trusts, for
the Restatement's characterization of trusts as donative, as opposed to contractual, "could be seen as
entirely consistent with mandatory arbitration of internal trust disputes." Id. "Interestingly, the first
Restatement is said to have adopted the donative approach to trusts not because that theory prevailed as
a matter of jurisprudential discourse (indeed, the contractarian approach had numerous supporters at
that time) but simply because that was the model favored by Scott." Id. at n.79.
198. Id. at 1248 (citing Charles Lloyd & Jonathan Pratt, Trust in Arbitration, 12 TR. & TRUSTEES 18,
18 (2006)).
199. Horton, supra note 35, at 1057.
200. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305, 308 (Tex. App. 2011). "The party attempting to compel arbi-
tration must show that the arbitration agreement meets all requisite contract elements." Id.
201. Id. at 311.
202. Id. at 312 (citing Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366 (Tex. App. 2007) ("[The] courts inter-
pret trust instruments as they would contracts").
203. Horton, supra note 35, at 1049. "As a matter of federal common law, the FAA hinges on wheth-
er the parties have agreed to arbitrate, not whether there is a "contract" in which the arbitration clause
appears. In turn, wills and trusts are capable of giving rise to agreements to arbitrate; indeed, no one
can be bound to the terms of a testamentary instrument against his wishes." Id
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This interpretation is consistent with the Texas legislature's decision to re-
quire that arbitration agreements be found in a "written agreement," and gives
meaning to this decision in a way that the Rachal majority's interpretation does
not. It follows logically that an arbitration agreement could exist in a valid trust
instrument, as long as neither violates contract principles. As such, the Rachal
court's proclamation that "a trust is not a contract,"204 is beside the point. A trust
need not be a contract for an arbitration provision contained in it to be enforcea-
ble. Contract principles are a framework for the court's analysis of arbitration
agreements, not a test of their enforceability. 205
That trusts are interpreted using contract principles, just like arbitration
agreements and traditional contracts, indicates that the distinction between trusts
and contracts, enunciated by the Schoneberger and Rachal opinions, is not dispos-
itive. As the Rachal dissent noted, in Texas, contract principles are used to verify
that arbitration agreements do not violate traditional contract rules, not to require
that they satisfy contract rules. 20 6 This shared relationship to contract law indicates
that arbitration's "foundation in contract law" cannot justify finding arbitration
agreements and trusts instruments incompatible.
D. Importance of the Settlor's Intent
In focusing on the differences between a trust and a contract, the Rachal ma-
jority did not consider the foundational principle of trust law that courts should
207
endeavor to uphold a settlor's unambiguous intent.
The Rachal court followed Texas precedent by analyzing the arbitration pro-
vision using contract principles. However, it failed to interpret the trust instrument
according to these same principles. As a result, the court abandoned its primary
responsibility when construing both trust instruments and contracts, namely, to
enforce the settlor's intent.208 Had the court analyzed the trust using contract law
principles, as Texas case law dictates,209 the court may have found that the trust
was an enforceable, written agreement. In failing to consider the importance of
drafter intent in analyzing both contracts and trusts, the court did not properly
employ Texas common law contract principles of interpretation. Thus, in choosing
not to uphold the settlor's unambiguous intent that any disputes arising out of the
trust be arbitrated, the Rachal court not only disregarded the primary responsibil-
ity of courts when interpreting both trusts and contracts, but also failed to follow
Texas common law precedent.
204. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 310.
205. Horton, supra note 35, at 1049-51.
206. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 313 (citing Lesikar, 237 S.W.3d at 366) (emphasis added).
207. Id. at 313; see also Murphy, supra note 41, at 652-57.
208. Lesikar v. Moon, 237 S.W.3d 361, 366-67 (Tex. App. 2007) ("The court interprets trust instru-
ments as it does contracts. Goldin v. Bartholow, 166 F.3d 710, 715 (5th Cir. 1999). [As such,] the
court's primary objective in construing a will or a trust is to determine the intent of the maker. Hurley
v. Moody Nat'l Bank of Galveston, 98 S.W.3d 307, 310 (Tex. App. 2003, no pet.).... To determine
the maker's intent, we are limited to the four corners of the trust instrument. Eckels v. Davis, Ill
S.W.3d 687, 694 (Tex. App. 2003).").
209. Rachal, 347 S.W.3d at 312-13.
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E. Rachal v. Reitz: Looking Ahead
Following the Texas Court of Appeals' decision in Rachal v. Reitz, petitioner
Hal Rachal filed a petition for review with the Supreme Court of Texas on Sep-
tember 9, 2011. On June 8, 2012 the Supreme Court of Texas granted Rachal's
petition for review. Oral arguments will be heard on November 7, 2012. With the
Diaz and Rachal opinions pending review,210 and the Schoneberger opinion super-
seded by statute, it appears that the sentiment motivating state legislatures may
have begun to shift judicial opinion. Thus, it is possible that the Rachal court was
correct in concluding that this issue is best suited to legislative action.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Rachal court should have more closely analyzed the language of the
TAA, and the relationship between trusts, arbitration agreements, and contract
principles under Texas common law. Had the Rachal court done so, the arbitration
provision in the Trust could have been enforceable, and A.F. Reitz's intent could
have been realized. As the Rachal court's analysis, and extensive legal commen-
tary reveals, the enforceability of mandatory arbitration provisions in trust instru-
ments may be best resolved by legislative action.
Trust arbitration provisions are enforceable under many current state arbitra-
tion statutes, when read broadly to allow for a variety of written agreements. Be-
cause both trusts and arbitration agreements are analyzed using contract princi-
ples, arbitration's foundation in contract law does not foreclose trust instruments
from including enforceable arbitration agreements. The traditional distinction
between trusts and contracts ignores the similarities between these legal instru-
ments, and the relationship between trust law and contract principles. Additional-
ly, trust law's focus on effectuating the settlor's intent is similarly found in con-
tract law's desire to uphold the intent of the parties to a contract. Thus, the rela-
tionship between trust law, arbitration agreements, and contract law reveals that
arbitration agreements and trust instruments are compatible. As such, courts
should endeavor to effectuate trust settlors' intent by enforcing arbitration provi-
sions found in valid trusts.
RACHEL M. HIRSHBERG
210. Rachal v. Reitz, 347 S.W.3d 305 (Tex. App. 2011), review granted (June 8, 2012); Diaz v.
Bukey, 195 Cal. App. 4th 315, 125 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610 (2011), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 8,
2011), review granted and opinion superseded, 257 P.3d 1129 (Cal. 2011).
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